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The ENP in the light of the new “neighbourhood clause” (Article 8 TEU) 
 
Dominik Hanf(*) 
 
 
to be published in : 
E. Lannon (ed.), Challenges of the European Neighbourhood Policy (PIE/Lang, Brussels 
2011) 
  
This short contribution outlines the renewed constitutional framework in which the “European 
Neighbourhood Policy” (ENP) is to be integrated and further developed (1.) and briefly 
discusses its possible implications for the finalité of the neighbourhood relationship in general 
and of the ENP more specifically (2.). This constitutional perspective reveals three – already 
well-known – conceptual problems of the ENP (3.).
1
 
 
1. The renewed constitutional framework 
The fundamental treaties of the Union did not, until now, contain a clause specifically 
dedicated to the Union‟s relationship with its neighbours. The Treaty of Lisbon inserted a new 
provision – Article 8
2
 – into the TEU,
3
 thus conferring a constitutional status on the Union‟s 
relationship with its neighbours as of 1 December 2009. 
 
1.1. The new Article 8 TEU 
The relevant “neighbourhood clause”, figuring prominently in Title I TEU, contains a number 
of indefinite legal concepts, leaving much scope for interpretation, in particular with regard to 
its geographical and substantive scope. 
First, Article 8 TEU applies to “neighbouring countries”. Although a literal reading would 
suggest that it covers only countries sharing either a land border or a sea border with the 
                                                          
(*)  Dr. iur. (Mainz) ; Docteur en droit (Liège) ; Professor of European Union Law at the College of Europe 
(Bruges). 
1  This text was written in January 2010. Please note that two substantial contributions on Article 8 TEU could 
only be considered for a limited revision (mainly of the footnotes) in May 2011: D. Thym, “Artikel 8 EUV”, in: 
E. Grabitz/M. Hilf/M. Nettesheim (eds.), Das Recht der Europäischen Union: Kommentar (Beck, Munich 
2010) and P. Van Elsuwege/R. Petrov, “Article 8 TEU: Towards a New Generation of Agreements with the 
Neighbouring Countries of the European Union?” (forthcoming in European Law Review 2011).  
2 Article 8 TEU – which reproduces literally Article I-57 of the never ratified Treaty establishing a Constitution 
for Europe - reads as follows : “1. The Union shall develop a special relationship with neighbouring 
countries, aiming to establish an area of prosperity and good neighbourliness, founded on the values of the 
Union and characterised by close and peaceful relations based on cooperation. 2. For the purposes of 
paragraph 1, the Union may conclude specific agreements with the countries concerned. These agreements 
may contain reciprocal rights and obligations as well as the possibility of undertaking activities jointly. Their 
implementation shall be the subject of periodic consultation.” 
3 Treaty establishing European Union (TEU), lastly modified by the Treaty of Lisbon (entered into force on 1 
December 2009), quoted according to the consolidated version published in the Official Journal of the 
European Union 2010, p. C 83/1 et seq.  
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Union, it can also be understood in a broader sense
4
 as to include “neighbours of the 
immediate neighbours”. The Union practice has taken the latter view.
5
 
Secondly, the substantive policy covered by the new “neighbourhood clause” seems to be 
similarly broad. Its objective is the establishment of an area of prosperity and good 
neighbourliness. The Union is thus encouraged to take potentially any political or economic 
measure suitable to achieve that aim. The term “special relationship”
6
 suggests two things: on 
the one hand, it does not exclude – and seems indeed to tend to – “deep” forms of 
cooperation with neighbouring countries; on the other hand, no specific single “blueprint” 
model of cooperation is prescribed. “Differentiation” is already current practice in the Union‟s 
relations with its neighbours – be it within or outside the ENP developed since 2003. 
Thirdly, the area of prosperity and good neighbourliness is can
7
 be achieved by means of 
“specific agreements”: Article 8 TEU therefore provides a new and specific legal basis 
empowering the Union to conclude neighbourhood agreements. It is modelled upon the 
wording of Article 217 TFEU
8
 which constitutes since the very foundation of the Community 
the legal basis for the Union‟s association agreements with third countries. One can, however, 
observe one difference: the new legal basis does not explicitly provide for “special 
procedures”, mentioning instead an obligation to monitor the implementation by means of 
“periodic consultation”. It is however recognised that the reference in Article 217 TFEU cannot 
be understood as a real enabling clause since special procedures are part of many 
agreements which do not qualify as association agreements. It aims thus at making clear that 
Union law does not allow the participation of third states in the Union‟s institutions: so-called 
“internal association” is consequently excluded.
9
 
The imposition of periodic consultations throughout the implementation of neighbourhood 
agreements by Article 8.2 TEU suggests therefore that this specific form of association 
agreements shall – or at least can – be subject to closer and frequent inspection.
10
  
 
                                                          
4 Although “neighbouring” is generally associated to terms like next, bordering, surrounding, connecting or 
adjacent, it can also mean “nearby” (not far away). As a noun, “neighbourhood” can mean a nearby region 
or an area. See Collins English Dictionary, Complete and Unabridged 6th Edition (HarperCollins Publishers 
2003). 
5 With the extension of the ENP‟s geographical scope to the Caucasus: including since the 2007-enlargement 
of the Union to Romania and Bulgaria, the EU has no direct border with Armenia and Azerbaijan. 
6 Plural, compare e.g. with the French (“des relations privilégiées”) or  German (“besondere Beziehungen”) 
versions. The term “special relationship” is however not further defined; the Treaty lacks also a definition of 
what could be considered as its opposite (“ordinary relationship”). 
7 The Union “may” conclude specific agreements, see Article 8.2. TEU. On the “optional character” of Article 
8.2 TEU see also D. Thym (footnote1) at 10-12. 
8 Ex-Article 310 TEC. The TEC has been modified and renamed into Treaty on the Functioning of the 
European Union (TFEU) by Treaty of Lisbon. The TFEU is cited according to the consolidated version 
published in the Official Journal of the European Union 2010, p. C 83/1 et seq. 
9 See Dominik Hanf/Pablo Dengler, “Accords d‟Association”, in : Commentaire Mégret (Publications de 
l‟Institut d‟études européennes de l‟Université Libre de Bruxelles, Bruxelles 2004), 293 et seq. providing 
further references. 
10 Waldemar Hummer, “Artikel I-57 EVV”, in: Christoph Vedder/Wolff Heintschel von Heinegg (eds.), 
Europäischer Verfassungsvertrag. Kommentar (Nomos, Baden-Baden 2007), p. 243 (at 21): 
“Manuduktionscharakter”. 
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1.2. Consequences for the conclusion of association agreements with neighbouring 
countries 
On the procedural formal side, the recently reformed Treaty system provides a new – and 
more specific – instrument to be used by the Union when concluding association agreements 
with one or several of its neighbouring countries.
11
 This – read together with Declaration No 3 
annexed to the TEU
12
 – implies that Article 8 TEU is not confined to countries included in the 
current ENP but applies to agreements to be concluded with any neighbouring state. 
Modifications of existing association agreements meeting the substantive criteria set out in 
Article 8 TEU already concluded with such countries – such as the EEA Agreement – would 
hence, at least in principle, need to be based on Article 8 TEU, too.
13
 
This interpretation of Article 8 TEU as a new legal basis for concluding and adopting specific 
association agreements means that the latter will need to be adopted by the Council acting 
unanimously
14
 after having obtained the Parliament‟s consent.
15
 
On the substantive side, Article 8 TEU allows the Union to conclude neighbourhood 
agreements relating to any policy field falling within the realm of its powers. Such agreements 
could thus in principle range from mere coordination to very advanced – and institutionalised 
– forms of cooperation. The obvious question is hence whether or not this new model of 
specific neighbourhood agreements would not need to meet more demanding substantive 
criteria depending on the “deepness” of the relationship they intend to establish. 
                                                          
11 Article 216.1 TFEU makes clear that a legal basis for concluding international agreements can also be found 
in the TEU (“where the treaties so provide”). It is true that Article 8.2 TEU, although based on the wording of 
Article 217 TFEU, does not explicitly refer to “association” and also uses a somewhat more cautious 
wording (“may contain … as well as the possibility …”). However, it allows for concluding “specific” 
agreements enabling thus the Union to fulfill its task (“shall develop”) of establishing “special relationship” 
(Article 8.1 TEU) with a selective circle of (“neighbouring”) countries. The significance of such agreements 
for the Union is further highlighted by the fact that Article 8 TEU figures prominently in the very first part of 
the TEU. Article 8.2 TEU can therefore be seen as the specific legal basis (lex specialis to Article 217 
TFEU) for concluding association agreements with neighbouring countries. 
12 According to that Declaration on Article 8 TEU annexed to the Treaty of Lisbon, “the Union will take into 
account the particular situation of small-sized countries which maintain specific relations of proximity with it”. 
13 Hummer (footnote 10) at 22 seems to suggest a different reading on that point. This is also the position of D. 
Thym (footnote 1) who considers – based on the general premise that the legal reach of Article 8 TEU 
should not be overstretched (at 6) – that the Union remains entirely free in the choice of legal instruments to 
be adopted in the pursuit of a comprehensive neighbourhood policy (at 12). Since the CJEU does 
consistently uphold the principle that the choice of a legal basis cannot be left to the discretion of the 
political institutions but needs to be established on objective criteria, this interpretation comes however 
close to denying Article 8 TEU a legal value of its own. Van Elsuwege/Petrov (footnote 1) suggest for such 
cases recourse to a “double legal basis” – a solution which would only be available if “neighbourhood 
agreements” were subjected to the same procedural requirements as “ordinary” association agreements (on 
this see next footnote). 
14 The unanimity requirement set by Article 218.8 TFEU for association agreements also applies to 
neigbourhood agreements. This follows from the fact that Article 8 TEU provides a lex specialis to Article 
217 TFEU and from the constitutional significance of such far-reaching agreements – which the Member 
States recognized explicitly by placing Article 8 prominently in Title I of the TEU. The (somewhat 
unhistorical) alternative interpretation based on the purely textual argument that the term “association” is not 
mentioned expressis verbis at Article 8 TEU – and which would confine Article 8 TEU to a merely symbolic 
provision – is discussed by Van Elsuwege and Petrov (footnote 1). Although D. Thym (footnote 1, at 12 and 
20) conceives of Article 8 TEU as a mere alternative to other legal bases (and in particular to Article 217 
TFEU), he also considers that both the genesis and ratio of Article 8 TEU point to extending the unanimity 
requirement of Article 218.8 TFEU to neighbourhood agreements. 
15 Article 218.6 lit. a (i.) TFEU, which applies on the basis of the reasoning developed in the previous footnote. 
At any rate, an agreement based on Article 8 TEU will generally be “establishing a specific institutional 
framework by organising cooperation procedures” (Article 218.6 lit. a (iii.) TFEU), have important budgetary 
implications for the Union (Article 218.6 lit. a (iv.) TFEU) and concern matters falling under the EP‟s co-
decision powers (Article 218.6 lit. a (v.) TFEU). See also D. Thym (footnote 1) at 19. 
 5 
On the one hand, the vagueness of the terms used in Article 8 TEU
16
 does not allow one to 
infer precise qualitative criteria from the Treaty. A broad interpretation as to the potential 
content of the agreements would also be supported by the practice developed over the past 
decades with respect to Article 217 TFEU: association agreements frame and organise a 
great variety of relationships ranging from development cooperation and inter-regional 
economic cooperation to very advanced integration of non-Member States into core policies 
of the Union.
17
 
On the other hand, the genesis
18
 and also the wording
19
 of Article 8 TEU would suggest that 
“neighbourhood agreements” should aim at more advanced forms of substantive cooperation 
along the lines of the most advanced forms of association the Union has already established 
with some European third countries. Such a reading is not per se excluded by the fact that the 
Treaty refrains from establishing itself – and thus mandates the institutions of the Union to 
define – the relevant substantive criteria. Since the neighbourhood clause was established 
against the backdrop of the existing models of advanced cooperation with third countries such 
as the EEA-Agreement, and is also subject to substantive conditions,
20
 it could even be read 
as “constitutionalising” the concept of “integration without membership”. 
In sum, Article 8 TEU can be understood as a purely programmatic provision. An alternative, 
non-compulsory, yet slightly more ambitious, interpretation would consider the neighbourhood 
clause as a new legal basis to be used by the Union for engaging with third countries by 
means of “advanced” agreements for “deep” forms of institutional and substantive 
cooperation. The politically responsible institutions of the Union would of course have a wide 
margin of discretion when assessing which degree of association which might be feasible and 
desirable with regard to the various third countries of the Union‟s neighbourhood. This 
discretion would also extend to the question whether an association is worth being “crowned” 
by a specific neighbourhood agreement. However, it seems that the Union could use Article 8 
TEU as a constitutional tool, and perhaps even recognise it as a duty, to formally distinguish 
between the “better” neighbours and the others, and to do so in an overall consistent 
manner.
21
 
This implies that the Union is thus free – and having regard to its “cooperation and 
association taxonomy” perhaps even obliged – to impose e.g. economic conditions before 
“upgrading” an existing relationship with a given country by means of concluding a more 
ambitious neighbourhood agreement. 
                                                          
16 Neighbourhood agreements “may contain” reciprocal rights and obligations etc., see Article 8.2 TEU. 
17 For an account see Hanf/Dengler (footnote 9). Van Elsuwege/Petrov (footnote 1) stress rightly that the 
classification of the agreements concluded by the Union with third countries has hitherto remained to a large 
extent a matter of politics, not law. 
18 Although geopolitical aspects played of course an important role in the birth of the ENP and of the 
Convention‟s predecessor of Article 8 TEU, it seems that the latter‟s main rationale has been to establish a 
“constitutional” alternative to membership. See on this the text at sub-section 1.4.  
19 Article 8.1 TEU qualifies the relationship to be developed both geographically (neighbours) and with regard 
to intensity (“special”, “close”) and the specific agreements according to Article 8.2. TEU are to be 
concluded “for the purposes” of developing such twofold qualified engagements. 
20 See sub-section 1.3. below. 
21 In practice, this would be a demanding yet not necessarily unhealthy task – and, given the very nature of the 
exercise, subject to rather limited judicial review (procedure, motivation). 
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1.3. Possible limits: principle of cooperation and Union values  
Article 8 TEU imposes two conditions to be respected by the Union when developing its ties 
with neighbouring countries: the special relationship needs to be “based on cooperation” and 
also to be “founded on the values of the Union”. 
The cooperation principle seems to stress the obvious fact that the Union‟s relationship with 
the neighbourhood can only be shaped with the consent of the third countries concerned. 
From a formal point of view, this is already inherent in the fact that international agreements 
need to be concluded by the Union, on the one hand, and a neighbouring state, on the other 
hand. In substance, one might ask whether forms of very advanced integration (as opposed 
to mere cooperation) should be ruled out of the scope of Article 8 TEU. This appears however 
to be inconsistent with both the programme set out in the neighbourhood clause and the 
Union‟s consistent association practice. A sensible interpretation would thus consist in 
understanding the cooperation principle as an exclusion of “internal associations” – i.e. the 
formal participation of third countries in the decision-making of the Union institutions.
22
 
More difficult to assess is the meaning and the scope of the condition according to which 
special relationship with neighbouring countries need to be “founded on” the values of the 
Union.
23
 This wording
24
 – which is borrowed from ex-Article 6.1 TEU
25
 and refers clearly to the 
political criteria to be met by the Member States of the Union
26
 - contrasts clearly with the 
softer “shall be guided” formula used in the general external action sections of the Treaty.
27
  
A strict interpretation of this condition would signify that the Union could only enter into 
“special relations” with neighbouring countries which do respect democracy, the rule of law, 
and human rights in the same way as the Union and its Member States. A wider interpretation 
would accept the neighbours‟ commitment to the Union‟s values without actually requiring an 
equivalent level of protection and/or application for the time being. Wording and context of 
Article 8 TEU sustain the former, more demanding interpretation. Applying such a standard to 
neighbourhood relations could however appear to be somewhat overdrawn if one considers 
that deficiencies in the implementation of Union values can be considered as temporary 
phenomena and thus should not necessarily qualify as absolute obstacles to the recognition 
of third countries as candidates for accession to the Union.
28
 
                                                          
22 In line with the common understanding of the reference to “special procedures” in Article 214 TFEU. 
23 These are set out in Article 2 TEU: “The Union is founded on the values of respect for human dignity, 
freedom, democracy, equality, the rule of law and respect for human rights, including the rights of persons 
belonging to minorities. These values are common to the Member States in a society in which pluralism, 
non-discrimination, tolerance, justice, solidarity and equality between women and men prevail.” 
24 Inserted into the “neighbourhood clause” at the request of several members of the European Convention 
(see CONV 671/03, 14 April 2003). 
25 “The Union is founded on the principles of liberty, democracy, respect for human rights and fundamental 
freedoms, and the rule of law, principles which are common to the Member States.” 
26 See Article 49 TEU for candidate states for accession to the EU and Article 7 TEU for Member States. 
27 Article 21 TEU (“The Union's action on the international scene shall be guided by the principles which have 
inspired its own creation, development and enlargement, and which it seeks to advance in the wider world: 
…”) and Article 205 TFEU (“The Union's action on the international scene, pursuant to this Part, shall be 
guided by the principles, pursue the objectives and be conducted in accordance with the general provisions 
laid down in…”). 
28 More recent examples provide the decisions of the Union to grant Turkey and Croatia the status of 
candidate countries. 
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Hence, one could argue that Article 8 TEU impedes the Union from entering into special 
relationship with neighbouring countries refusing to commit themselves to the values of the 
Union. The same would be the case for countries actively obstructing such a commitment. 
Finally, the limitation would arguably also apply in an unsatisfactory situation where no signs 
of improvement are shown over time. The conclusion of more advanced neighbourhood 
agreements would require a decent record – or at least a process of considerable 
improvement – in terms of human rights protection, the rule of law and democracy. 
 
1.4. The Neighbourhood Clause and Accession 
The roots of this new Treaty clause can be traced back to a rather early stage of the 
institutional reform process of the Union which lasted almost an entire decade.
29
 There is 
nevertheless no clear evidence for the reasons which led to the “constitutionalisation” of the 
Union‟s relations with its neighbouring countries.
30
 Some suspected that the main purpose of 
the clause was to confine neighbouring states to a permanent non-member status.
31
  
Closer analysis of the relevant Treaty articles does not confirm such fears. Qualifying under 
the neighbourhood clause does not entail in itself the disqualification of a third country from 
the accession: all “European” neighbours retain a right to apply for – but not necessarily to 
obtain
32
 - Union membership (Article 49 TEU).
33
 For these states, special neighbourhood 
relationship could in fact indeed constitute a preparation for accession. 
Since non-European neighbours were never given the right to apply for membership, Article 8 
TEU could not affect any right of these states with regard to accession. 
 
1.5. Result 
The new neighbourhood clause in the Treaty is essentially (but not exclusively) programmatic 
in nature. It stresses the importance of political and economic stability in the Union‟s “near 
abroad” while highlighting the Union‟s commitment to contribute to such stability by means of 
cooperation with the neighbouring states. 
The clause remains vague as to the content and form of the Union‟s neighbourhood policy, 
adding no substance to the existing constitutional provisos. As a result, the institutions of the 
Union continue to have a great margin of discretion as to policies, methods, instruments and 
                                                          
29 The Praesidium of the Convention for the Future of Europe proposed to reflect about a clause “defining a 
privileged relationship between the Union and its neighbouring States” in its first preliminary draft of 22 
October 2002 (see CONV 369/02, p. 16). A subsequent proposal was approved by the Convention without 
much debate (see the summary of the reactions, CONV 671/03, 14 April 2003) and has been only subject to 
minor editorial modifications in the subsequent IGCs. Note that a more sober version had been proposed in 
the so-called “Pénélope project”, an interesting yet largely ignored feasibility study worked out by senior 
Commission officials: “L'Union établit des relations privilégiées avec ses États voisins par des accords 
d'association.” (see Article 27, Relations avec les États voisins, in : F. Lamoureux e.a., Contribution à un 
avant-projet de Constitution de l‟Union européenne, document de travail, Bruxelles, 4 December 2003, p.9). 
30 It seems that the President of the Convention made sure that the provision was maintained in the Draft 
Constitutional Treaty because he was personally convinced that EU-enlargement could not be pursued 
endlessly, see D. Thym (note 1) at 2 (with reference to Madallon, RTDE 2005, 493 at 516 et seq.). 
31 Originally, the clause constituted a specific section dedicated to “The Union and its Neighbours” neatly 
separated from the provisions on “Union Membership”. 
32 Article 49 TEU does not contain a right to accession but only imposes on the Union (i.e. chiefly the Council) 
to duly examine requests for membership. 
33 See also D. Thym (footnote 1) at 7 (and note 6). 
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institutional frameworks to be adopted with regard to individual or groups of neighbouring 
states. The hitherto single traditional limit remains intact: “internal association” – participation 
of third countries in Union institutions – is precluded. Furthermore, it is possible – yet not 
mandatory – to infer from Article 8 TEU a duty of the Union to reserve the new instrument of 
“neighbourhood agreements” only to particularly advanced forms of institutionalised and 
substantive relationship. 
The new constitutional framework for shaping the Union‟s neighbourhood relations does 
hence not appear to entail major consequences for the ENP as developed since 2003 with 
regard to the eastern and southern neighbouring countries (and recently somewhat 
“relaunched” by means of the so-called “Union for the Mediterranean” and “Eastern 
Partnership” respectively). 
The new neighbourhood clause could however impact on the current ENP as far as it extends 
to third countries accounting for questionable records in terms of democracy, the rule of law 
and human rights since the “special relationship” needs to be founded on the values of the 
Union. Even if this limit were interpreted cautiously, the Treaty would oppose to the 
development of closer relations with those neighbours defying - or only paying lip services to - 
democracy, the rule of law, and human rights as understood by the Union. The Union would 
also need to make sure that enhancing its relationship with such states would at least need to 
go hand in glove with a steady improvement in the respect of these values. 
In other words, the Treaty seems to impose since 1 December 2009 a constitutional duty on 
the Union to apply the concept of “conditionality” to the implementation of the ENP by 
ensuring the respect of its own values by neighbouring states. 
 
2. The “finalité” of the ENP 
As already seen, the new neighbourhood clause of the TEU is not overly explicit on the 
precise form the “special relationship” between the Union and its neighbouring countries 
should take. 
 
2.1. “Outer limits” and the EEA as an “ideal type” model 
The main “outer limits” of neighbourhood relationships are however well established: on the 
one hand, they can include – and should indeed aim at – very advanced and institutionalised 
forms of association covering potentially all policy fields of the Union, provided that the values 
of the Union are at least generally respected. On the other hand, the Treaty excludes sharing 
Union institutions (“internal association”) with neighbouring states, be they non-members due 
to the geographical condition set out in Article 49 TEU or due to an explicit or implicit political 
decision (“protected” by the same Treaty provision) to keep a European state outside the 
Union.
34
 
                                                          
34 This implies that the creation of a common supranational “EEA-Plus” integrating the EU and its neighbours – 
an interesting idea de lege ferenda mentioned by Peter Xuereb during the Workshop – would require a 
revision of the EU Treaty. See ECJ, Opinion 1/1991 (EEA I), ECR I-6079.  
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The association coming closest in practice to a true “area of prosperity and good 
neighbourliness” – and hence to the objective of the neighbourhood clause – is the 
Agreement on the European Economic Area (EEA). Like the ENP, it had originally been 
conceived as a far-reaching and consequently attractive alternative to Union membership. 
One could thus argue that qualified neighbourhood relations should ideally aim at achieving a 
degree of substantive economic and political integration comparable to the one established by 
the EEA (or the set of bilateral treaties concluded between the Union and Switzerland). 
 
2.2. Conditionality and “finalité” 
“Special” or “deep” relationships – which in particular in the context of economic integration 
entail rights and obligations granted to and imposed upon individuals - require the application 
of a common set of fundamental common principles. 
As already observed, the new neighbourhood clause of the Treaty contains one new element: 
the obligation imposed on the Union to apply a value-based conditionality in neighbourhood 
relations - which is more demanding than the mere value-orientation generally to be observed 
in the context of the Union‟s external action. 
This would also support the reading that an advanced relationship such as that established by 
the EEA could be considered as a near ideal model for the programme set out in the 
neighbourhood clause of the Treaty. 
 
2.3. Developing the neighbourhood area: the ENP as a transformation process 
If the “finalité” of Article 8 TEU is ultimately to be situated on the upper level of the so-called 
“Hallstein scale” (i.e. a substantive economic and political integration stopping short of a 
participation in the Union institutions), the “finalité” of ENP developed since 2003 is thus to 
organise the process which could one day lead to such result. 
The ENP follows a gradual – and differentiated – approach, taking existing agreements as a 
starting point and aiming at progressively “upgrading” the bilateral and multilateral relations. 
As already observed, this is in line with the largely programmatic character of Article 8 TEU: 
the provision recognises the admissibility of a pragmatic step-by-step advancement and also 
underlines that the neighbourhood area should be characterised by relations “based on 
cooperation”.  
However, the development of a “special relationship” is nevertheless to be subjected to 
increasing value-based – i.e. far-reaching political – conditionality. 
Furthermore, since the ENP is in practice designed as a process which aims to progressively 
integrate the economically least developed neighbouring countries into a set of Union policies, 
it also requires that further progress be made conditional on the fulfilment of a set of 
economic conditions. 
 10 
Although the ENP can only be based on cooperation between the Union and its neighbours, 
and also requires efforts and adjustments on the Union side,
35
 its development will in practice 
(for both constitutional and economic reasons) imply in no small measure an alignment of the 
neighbouring countries to the Union standards and preferences. The Union’s ENP is thus in 
the first place an instrument to encourage and sustain political and economic reforms in the 
neighbouring countries concerned. This is also recognised in the relevant key documents 
defining the ENP and translates into the use, by the Commission, of identical or only slightly 
modified instruments which had been previously developed within the framework of its pre-
enlargement strategies. 
 
3. Problems of the ENP 
Measured against the objective set out in Article 8 TEU, the current ENP faces – even after its 
latest development following the version following the introduction of the “Union for the 
Mediterranean” and the “Eastern Partnership”
36
 – (at least) three well-known fundamental 
conceptual problems.
37
 
 
3.1. Process, not Policy 
Although “policy” is a relatively broad concept, the presentation of the current ENP as a 
“Union policy” suggests a kind of single and coherent framework applying to all neighbouring 
countries. This is in line with the overarching objective of the Union to progressively define its 
own geographical borders and at the same time to develop close economic and political ties 
with its neighbours as a means to safeguard its own security understood in the largest sense 
of the word. 
In reality, the existing ties with the many different neighbouring countries as well as their 
interests and expectations with regard to the Union (and often also vice-versa) differ greatly. 
This means in practice that ENP has to be handled flexibly. Differentiation has thus become 
the key feature of the ENP – to such extent that one wonders whether its qualification as a 
“policy” is not misleading. 
                                                          
35 Suffice to mention visa – and more generally immigration – policy, gradual opening the agricultural markets, 
technical and financial assistance. 
36 Most recent assessments by the Union institutions include the Commission‟s and High Representative‟s 
Joint Communications of 8 March 2011 (“A Partnership for Democracy and Shared Prosperity with the 
Southern Mediterranean”, COM (2011) 200 final) and 25 May 2011 (“A new response to a changing 
neighbourhood”, COM (2011) 303), and the Commission‟s Communication of 12 May 2011 (“Taking stock of 
the ENP”, COM (2011) 207). 
37 On the ENP see e.g. M. Cremona/C. Hillion, “L‟Union fait la force? Potential and Limitations of the ENP as 
an Integrated EU Foreign and Security Policy” (EUI Working Paper 2006/39, Florence 2006) ; M. 
Cremona/G. Meloni (eds.), The ENP : A Framework for Modernisation ? (EUI Working Paper 2007/21, 
Florence 2007) ; C. Hillion, “Mapping out the new contractual relations between the European Union and its 
neighbours”, 12 (2007) European Foreign Affairs Review 169-182 ; R. Petrov, “Exporting the Acquis 
Communautaire into the Legal Systems of Third Countries”, 13 (2008) European Foreign Affairs Review 33-
52 ; A. Albi, “The EU‟s „External Governance‟ and Legislative Approximation by Neighbours”, 14 (2009) 
European Foreign Affairs Review 209-230 ; F. Maiani/R. Petrov/E. Mouliardova (eds.) European Integration 
Without EU Membership: Models, Experiences, Perspectives (EUI Working Paper MPW 2009, 10, Florence 
2009) ; D. Kochenov, “The Eastern Partnership, the Union for the Mediterranean and the remaining need to 
do something with the ENP” (CRCEES Working Papers 2009/01) and the contributions to the present 
volume. 
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This is not just a matter of semantics. In the long run, misleading labelling – the rebranding of 
the Barcelona Process as a “Union” for the Mediterranean being the latest example – affects 
both the intelligibility and legitimacy of a policy regardless its potential or real achievements. 
 
3.2. Incentives 
The ENP does not usually offer very strong incentives for neighbouring countries to undergo 
painful political and economic reforms which are generally needed in order to engage into 
close relationship with the Union. 
The prospect of membership – which has proved to be a very powerful incentive – is explicitly 
excluded. This explains why European neighbours such as Ukraine have never really 
accepted the ENP. They merely use it as the tool which is currently available for their strategy 
to promote their real objective, which is to join the Union. 
The prospects of an advanced economic integration have so far also remained vague (both in 
terms of objectives and instruments). To provide a real incentive, the ultimate objective of a 
deep substantive economic, and correspondingly political, integration – i.e. the extension of 
the Internal Market as operated by the EEA or the bilateral EU-Switzerland agreements – 
needs to be more clearly spelled out. This would arguably have to include explicitly aspects 
which the Union considers to be “too sensitive”, in particular free movement of persons, and a 
more generous use of “hard law” instruments. 
This is not to say that the present framework does not already set some incentives, and some 
neighbouring countries appear in fact to discover and to progressively use the potential 
presently offered. However, in their present shape they do not provide an overly strong 
stimulus for third countries willing to integrate with the Union to accept and implement difficult 
compromises and adjustments. Moreover, depending on their current domestic political and 
economic structures, even the prospect of a full-blown economic and political integration 
might prove to be plainly unattractive for some of the neighbouring countries. 
The flexible nature of the ENP (differentiation) is also problematic in this respect: it appears 
not to be the result of any Union policy concept or strategy but the simple consequence of the 
fact that the Union‟s offers do not seduce all neighbouring states to the same extent. 
 
3.3. Conditionality  
The new Article 8 TEU imposes upon the Union the obligation to apply a value-based 
conditionality when engaging in neighbourhood relationships. As already seen, this condition 
can be considered as being satisfied – in particular as cooperation remains at less advanced 
stages – when a neighbouring country commits itself to the Union values and produces 
evidence that it also progressively implementing them in practice. 
Putting this obligation into practice is indeed a demanding task. It raises a number of 
questions relating, on the one hand, to the precise criteria to be used at a given stage in the 
developing special relationship and, on the other hand, to the evaluation method to be 
 12 
applied. This is especially true in respect of the non-European neighbouring states which are 
not bound by (and cannot adhere to) the European Convention of Human Rights. 
Conditionality is likely to produce the expected results when it supports an existing domestic 
policy process driving towards the implementation of EU values. It is also likely to work 
“better” when the Union is able to sustain its support by setting incentives, including those – 
still suboptimal – incentives offered by the ENP. 
Should the domestic conditions in a neighbouring state be unfavourable or outright opposed 
to the acceptance of EU values, the ENP and its limited incentives alone are unlikely to make 
conditionality “work”. As a result of the introduction of the conditionality condition into the 
Treaty, the Union would be formally impeded from engaging in advanced cooperation with 
such neighbours, and would be obliged to “downgrade” or even suspend existing 
relationships as it has been the case of Belarus and Syria. 
As long as relationships with “problematic” neighbouring countries remain at a low level of 
intensity, the new explicit Treaty-based obligation to “export” the Union values into its vicinity 
is unlikely to entail major difficulties. Things are different when cooperation – and be it limited 
to selected sectors – intensifies and does not directly relate to supporting the development of 
democracy and the rule of law: even a generous interpretation of the “Union values condition” 
in Article 8 TEU sits uncomfortably with enhanced cooperation between the Union and a 
neighbouring state with a problematic human rights and rule of law record. 
So far, this problem “only” constituted a credibility gap within the ENP as conceived by the 
Union institutions, of which many (in the Union) took notice only very recently as a 
consequence of the “Arab Spring”. After the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, the Union 
needs to decide whether Article 8 TEU will have the effect of “constitutionalising” that gap or 
whether it will give real substance to the hitherto rather shallow concepts of “shared values” 
and “joint ownership”. 
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